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Filling in the Gaps in Long Tern1 
Care Insurance 
Policy Implications for Informal 
Care Workers 
I nformal care, defined as unpaid care or care that is pro-vided outside of the market, comprises a significant por-tion of all long term care of the elderly. Most informal 
care is provided by family members, and among family members, daughters are 
the largest source of this care. Daughters are more likely than sons to be the pri-
mary source of care, and on average provide more hours of care than do sons. In 
addition, the wives of frail elders provide a substantial portion of informal care. 
These facts imply that women, to a _greater extent than men, play an important 
role in the long term care of elderly family members. Research findings suggest 
that more than half of all women will provide care for an ill or disabled person at 
some point in their lives (Robinson, Moen, and Dempster-McClain 1995). Over 
time, women's participation in elder care has remained significant, despite in-
creasing pressures on women's time from career and family obligations. 
This chapter examines the connections among women's roles in the provision 
of long term care, the structure of the health insurance system for the elderly in 
the United States, and the policy options for reducing the burden of long term 
care. The first part of the chapter deals with the characteristics of the provision 
of long term care in the United States. In particular, I discuss how existing public 
and private insurance options fall short of covering all long term care needs, and 
the degree to which women participate in the provision of informal care. I use 
the term caregiver when citing previous research studies that employ this term to 
refer to those who provide informal care. Because many providers of informal 
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care do so at a serious cost of their time and well-being, I use the term care 
worker elsewhere. 
I next turn to the question of how current policy solutions may alter the dy-
namics of informal care. Policy solutions to the burden of long term care have the 
potential for serious changes for care workers. Of the leading policy options, pri-
vate insurance is seen by many as the best way to shift the burden of care from 
families and Medicaid to the paid private sector. Current attempts to increase 
private insurance include tax incentives for long term care insurance and public-
private partnerships for long term care. Despite the focus on private insurance, 
there is much evidence that private insurance lacks the potential to alter long 
term care coverage on a large scale. For this reason, policies to increase private 
insurance coverage are unlikely to significantly reduce the burden of care work 
on family members. 
A second policy option for long term care is social insurance. Social insurance 
for long term care is subject to many criticisms. One such criticism is that com-
pulsory social insurance programs may actually make individuals worse off, if 
they would prefer that family members serve as a form of "insurance" for long 
term care. The evidence, however, fails to support this criticism of social insur-
ance for long term care. The cost of social insurance for long term care is also 
thought to be prohibitive, but the high cost of informal care work for those who 
provide it must also be considered. If the United States considers reducing the 
burden on care providers to be a policy goal, then these types of evidence sug-
gest that the current form of market-based policies aimed at increasing private 
insurance will have limited effectiveness. Other forms of market-based policies or 
social insurance options need to be explored. 
Insurance for long term care in the United States 
Despite the presence of an entitlement program for acute care, the United States 
health insurance system is characterized by serious gaps in the coverage of long-
term care for the elderly. The gap begins with the Medicare program, which is 
the major source of health insurance for nearly 40 million Americans over age 65. 
Medicare covers most acute care needs, but does not include coverage for chronic 
care such as nursing home care. The exception is when an elderly person is re-
leased to a skilled nursing facility (SNF) directly from an inpatient hospital stay 
and under physicians' orders. In this case, only the first 20 days of care in the 
skilled nursing facility are covered. With the purchase of supplemental insurance 
for Medicare-or Medigap-individuals have the option of additional coverage 
for SNF care. Three-fourths of all Medicare recipients own Medigap policies, and 
three-fourths of those policies include an option for additional coverage for 
skilled nursing home facility care (Rice, Graham, and Fox 1997). Although these 
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statistics suggest that Medigap coverage for nursing care is widespread, this type 
of coverage is inadequate. It covers a maximum of 100 days of care in a skilled 
nursing facility, and then only when preceded by a Medicare-covered hospital 
stay. Most important, the care provided in skilled nursing facilities is distinct 
from the custodial or personal care provided in nursing homes, which includes 
the kind of assistance with eating, dressing, and bathing that is often required 
by those in need of long term care. It is expected that many elderly are unaware 
that Medicare and Medigap fail to cover nursing home costs and other long term 
care expenses. In the absence of these types of coverage for long term care, many 
must choose between "spending down" their assets to become recipients of Med-
icaid or purchasing expensive private insurance. 
Medicaid 
The cost of a year of nursing home care averages around $40,000 in the U.S. , 
and varies significantly by region. Paying for this type of care out of pocket 
can quickly exhaust the savings of many elderly persons. When their assets are 
near depletion, many recipients of long term care become eligible for the Med-
icaid program, the means-tested public health insurance program for the poor, 
disabled, and medically needy. Under the eligibility criteria of the program, as-
sets can be no greater than roughly $2,000, excluding the value of the individ-
ual's home. Any monthly income in excess of a small nursing home al-
lowance - typically $30 a month - is transferred to the state to compensate for 
part of the cost of nursing home care. For many of the elderly, public programs 
such as Medicaid are the primary means of financing long term care needs. Of 
the $n5.1 billion spent on long term care in 1997, 60 percent was financed by 
the federal government and states (Health Care Financing Administration 
1999a). In 1997, 14 percent of al~ public medical expenditures on health care 
went toward nursing home care or home healthcare (Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration 1999a). 
While Medicaid pays a substantial share of the costs of long term care, there 
are many concerns about the quality of care received in Medicaid-affiliated in-
stitutions. The low reimbursement rates set for nursing homes by Medicaid have 
led to concern about uneven care and inadequate medical attention (Institute of 
Medicine 1986). In addition to concerns about quality, the elderly and their 
families may also be concerned about the stigma attached to participation in 
Medicaid, known as a welfare-related insurance program for the poor. Medicaid 
is also biased toward institutional care. Almost three-fourths of Medicaid 
spending on long term care in 1996 was directed toward institutional care, with 
the remainder going for community-based care (Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration 1998). 
Filling in the Gaps in Long Term Care Insurance 205 
Private Insurance for long term care 
Privately purchased insurance policies can cover long term care costs without 
requiring the insured to deplete private assets or to enter a Medicaid-affiliated 
institution. These types of policies are relatively new products and are still not 
widely held. The market for private long term care insurance came into exis-
tence in the mid-198os, and it is estimated that about 4 to 5 percent of the el-
derly hold such policies. There is a great deal of variation in the features of pri-
vate long term care insurance policies. Policies usually cover stays in nursing 
homes, and sometimes cover home care, community care, or adult day care. Be-
nefits usually become payable when the insured person is unable to perform cer-
tain activities of daily living, such as bathing, dressing, and eating, although 
some policies require medical certification or prior hospitalization before be-
nefits are triggered. Policies also vary in the length of the elimination (waiting) 
period, which may mean that benefits begin between 20 and 100 days after the 
insured enters a nursing home. Once the insurance company begins making pay-
ments, payments may cover only the services specifically defined by the policy, 
or the insurer may pay benefits to the insured regardless of the specific services 
received. In most cases benefits are paid out daily or weekly (to coincide with the 
daily or weekly rates of nursing home care) and up to some lifetime maximum 
amount. Some policies are sold with inflation protection, which allows benefits to 
increase with inflation. 
One suggested explanation for the low coverage levels of private insurance is 
the size of the premiums. In 1995, the average annual premium for a standardized 
individual long term care insurance policy, including inflation protection and 
other options, was $2,560 for a 65-year-old; the annual premium for the same pol-
icy purchased by a 75-year-old individual was $8,146 (Coronel and Kitchman 
1997). Many elderly may forgo the purchase of insurance because they lack infor-
mation about insurance policies or about their own future needs. In addition, the 
availability of insurance policies for long term care may be limited. Insurance 
companies may be wary of the costs of offering this type of insurance since it 
holds greater appeal to those already in need to care. 
In summary, while the Medicare program addresses the acute-care needs of 
the elderly, it does not provide the long term care that an estimated 7. 3 million 
Americans over age 65 need. Medicare supplemental insurance does not provide 
coverage for chronic care either. Private long term care insurance is available; 
however, it is not very common, and the policies can be very expensive. Private 
insurance is often unavailable to individuals who are already in poor health and 
appear to need care in the near future. Companies will inquire about previous 
hospitalization or wheelchair use before issuing a policy; they may also review 
medical records and physician assessments of the individual's health. Coverage is 
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often refused for persons with serious conditions that indicate nursing home use 
in the near future; individuals with other pre-existing conditions may have diffi-
culty finding coverage or receiving benefits. The high cost of private insurance 
options, in conjunction with the quality concerns associated with Medicaid and 
institutional care in general, could explain in part the prevalence of informal 
caregiving by family members. 
The Prevalence of Informal Caregiving 
In contrast to statistics that suggest low levels of formal (market-based) insur-
ance for long term care, many studies have noted the prevalence of informal care-
giving. Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the care provided to impaired elderly 
persons is carried out by family members (Cantor 1989:106- 7). Early studies, 
based on the 1982 National Long Term Care Survey, indicate that daughters and 
wives are especially involved in the provision of care. Stephens and Christianson 
( 1986) found that daughters spent six hours per day providing care, while sons 
spent about four hours (46 - 47). Similarly, Stone, Cafferata, and Sangl (1987) 
found that caregivers are predominantly female (72 percent) and that daughters 
were more likely than sons to assume the role of caregiver. A large majority of 
caregivers (90 percent) provided care without the assistance of formal services. 
Many caregivers were also employed in market work at the time they provided 
care; more than 40 percent of daughters and 50 percent of sons had paying jobs. 
Almost one-third of these caregivers reported family incomes that were below or 
near the poverty line. 
Analysis of more recent data has been consistent with earlier evidence of a 
greater level of involvement by women and daughters in caregiving activities. 
Three-quarters of primary caregiyers sampled in the 1989 National Long Term 
Care Survey were female (Doty, Jackson, and Crown 1998). The care recipients in 
this survey were predominantly low income. Nearly 73 percent had incomes 
under $15,000 a year, which suggests serious financial constraints for the 40 per-
cent of primary caregivers who are spouses, as well as other family members. 
Analysis of data from the 1993 Study of Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest 
Old showed that daughters were 9 percentage points more likely than sons to 
provide care, controlling for characteristics of the care recipient and the care-
giver (Wolf, Freedman, and Soldo 1997). When care was provided by both sons 
and daughters, daughters provided between ro and 18 more hours of care per 
month than sons. Even when differences in past receipt of financial support from 
parents are taken into account, daughters remain more likely to provide care to 
parents than sons (Henretta, Hill, Li, Soldo, and Wolf 1997). 
Spitze and Logan ( 1990) summarize several explanations for the difference in 
caregiving efforts between daughters and sons. Leading explanations include so-
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ciety's assignment of gender roles, which designate nurturing activities to 
women more than men, and the stronger emotional bonds between daughters 
and their parents. Economic factors may also explain the larger role of women in 
the caregiving process. Women face a lower opportunity cost of providing care 
because fewer women than men work outside the home, and their wages tend to 
be lower. Differences in caregiving efforts remain, however, when labor market 
status is held constant (Stoller 1983). 
The burden of informal caregiving may be even greater among women of 
color. Previous research has found that blacks use fewer days of nursing home 
care than whites, either because of discrimination by nursing homes (Falcone and 
Broyles 1994) or because blacks have been shown to have a greater availability of 
unpaid caregivers among family members (Burton, Kasper, Shore, Cagney, 
LaVeist, Cubbin, and German 1995). A survey of caregivers conducted by the Na-
tional Alliance for Caregiving and the American Association of Retired Persons 
(AARP) reported that caregiving was slightly more prevalent among Asian, 
African-American, and Latino families than white families (National Alliance for 
Caregiving and the AARP 1997). 
The persistent finding of women's significant role in the provision of long 
term care has motivated much research on the effects of caregiving on women's 
work patterns and well-being. The causal relationship between care work and 
employment has been difficult to identify empirically because of the possible ex-
istence of reverse causality (that is, employment status may shape one's decision 
to engage in care work), and the inability to control for certain factors that may 
affect both employment and care work decisions simultaneously. As a result, the 
research in this area often reports mixed results, depending on the choice of 
econometric techniques and other differences in data sets and time periods. Of 
the many studies on the linkage between care work and employment, only a sub-
set specifically address the problems of causality or simultaneity. Wolf and Soldo 
( 1994) reported that among married women, caring for an elderly parent was not 
associated with reduced employment or hours of work. In a similar study using 
different data, Ettner (1995) found that for women ages 35 to 64, living with a 
disabled parent led to a significant reduction in hours worked. Using three years 
of data on caregiving and labor force participation, Pavalko and Artis (1997) 
found that caregivers experienced a reduction in the number of hours in paid 
employment when care work began, and that when care work ceased, there was 
no increase in hours of paid employment. 
Studies of caregivers also reveal serious behavioral health consequences. Gal-
lagher, Rose, Rivera, Lovett, and Thompson (1989) reported that 49 percent of fe-
male caregivers were clinically depressed, and George and Gwyther (1986) found 
that caregivers of demented adults used prescription drugs for depression, anxi-
ety, and insomnia at two to three times the rate of the rest of the population. In 
economic terms, the cost of the time spent providing informal care is substantial. 
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Estimates of the opportunity cost of informal care services based on the mini-
mum wage suggest that providing informal care for an elderly person with a 
problem in at least one activity of daily living can cost between $7,280 and 
$10,403 a year (Robinson 1997:245). Estimates based on the market value of in-
formal care services (the cost of informal care were it purchased in the market) 
are similar, and are as much as $7,680 a year (Harrow, Tennstedt, and McKinlay 
1995). As would be expected, the value of informal care for persons with 
Alzheimer's disease is much greater, and has been estimated to be $34,000 a year 
(Max, Webber, and Fox 1995). Ward (1990) estimated that the total value of un-
compensated care provided by family members, in terms of forgone wages, may 
be as much as 18 billion a year. Thus, in terms of the opportunity cost of time 
and in terms of psychic costs of illness and stress, informal caregiving places a 
high cost on those who provide it. 
A variety of demographic trends suggest that the burden of caregiving on 
women will increase. The population aged 65 and older numbered 34.2 million in 
1995 and is projected to be about 60.8 million by the year 2025. Gains in the life 
expectancy of 65-year-olds, from 14 years in 1980 to a projected 15.6 years in 
1999, imply that the duration of caregiving may lengthen. Finally, the trend to-
ward smaller family size, from 3.6 persons in 1970 to 3.2 persons in 1995, implies 
that there will be fewer caregivers available in the form of family members. These 
demographic trends together suggest that the demand for long term care will in-
crease in the near future while the supply of informal care providers decreases 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997; Health Care Financing Administration 1999b). 
Policies to Address the Burden of long term care 
The low level of private coverage for long term care is associated with high levels 
of informal caregiving by family members, and also with high levels of public ex-
penditure by the federal government and the states. The costs of long term care 
borne by the Medicaid program totaled more than $69. 1 billion in 1993, and long 
term care spending by Medicaid grew at an average rate of 13.2 percent a year 
between 1989 and 1993 (U.S. General Accounting Office 1995:8, 13) . Only a small 
fraction of total long term care costs (0.2 percent of $100 billion) was paid by pri-
vate long term care insurance. In an attempt to keep these costs under control, 
several policies have been considered or are being evaluated. While the control 
of formal costs is the primary motivation for these types of policies, increasing 
coverage for private long term care insurance may provide some relief to care 
workers themselves. In the United States, current policy initiatives for long term 
care have focused primarily on using the market for private insurance as a way to 
reduce public costs. These policies include tax incentives for long term care in-
surance and public-private partnerships for long term care. 
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Tax Incentives for Long Term Care Insurance 
There have been various attempts to use the tax code to create incentives for the 
purchase of private long term care insurance, dating back to its emergence on the 
market. In 1988, the House of Representatives considered legislation to align the 
tax treatment of long term care insurance with the treatment given to health in-
surance plans, and to offer tax credits to individuals who purchased long term 
care insurance. This attempt at legislation failed, as did similar legislation intro-
duced in 1991. In 1994, calls to change the tax treatment of long term care insur-
ance appeared in the Republicans' Contract with America. These were followed 
in 1995 by proposed legislation to exclude employer contributions to long term 
care from employer and employee gross income and to treat long term care ex-
penses as medical expenses, thus making them tax-deductible. Finally, with the 
passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (the 
Kassebaum-Kennedy legislation), Congress successfully enacted tax incentives 
for long term care insurance. Effective January 1, 1997, taxpayers could deduct 
qualified long term care expenses as itemized medical expenses. The allowable 
deductions include the premium for long term care insurance coverage. In addi-
tion, employer contributions toward the cost of group long term care insurance 
became a tax-deductible expense for employers. 
Proposals to increase long term care insurance through tax incentives have 
been openly criticized. In their 1994 book Sharing the Burden, authors Wiener, 
Illston, and Hanley include a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of allow-
ing employer contributions and the taxpayer purchase of long term care insur-
ance to be tax-deductible. Taxpayer deductions of the cost of long term care in-
surance are equivalent to subsidies for long term care insurance premiums, 
where the size of the subsidy increases with the marginal tax rate. This type of 
subsidy is regressive, in that it benefits higher-income households more than 
lower-income households. As a result the benefits of tax incentives are much 
smaller for the members of low-income families who provide a disproportionate 
share of unpaid care work and who face the greatest challenge in affording this 
type of insurance. 
Wiener, Illston, and Hanley also state that the effect of deductions for long 
term care insurance on long term care coverage is limited by the fact that few 
taxpayers itemize deductions. They cite statistics showing that only 29 percent of 
tax returns included itemized deductions, and only 4 percent included itemized 
medical deductions in 1993. The authors also estimate that the costs for each ad-
ditional person with long term care insurance under tax policies similar to those 
included in the Kassebaum-Kennedy legislation would be quite high, and would 
exceed any Medicaid savings. They also suggest that those most likely to benefit 
from these tax policies are individuals who would have purchased insurance in 
the absence of subsidies (Wiener, Illston, and Hanley 1994:85-86). 
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and the care expenses must have been incurred so that the taxpayer could con-
tinue working. Proposals to extend the dependent care tax credit during the 
ro5th Congress were unsuccessful. 
President Clinton's initiative differs significantly in that the proposed $r,ooo 
credit would apply to informal care costs in addition to out-of-pocket expenses. 
This proposal takes an unprecedented step to recognize the value of informal 
costs, and builds on efforts to lessen the burden of providing care for families 
through the Family and Medical Leave Act of r993. The initiative nonetheless has 
its limitations. A $r,ooo tax credit is only a fraction of the total cost borne by 
those who provide informal long term care. Estimates place the informal care any-
where from seven to ten times that amount, and as much as 34 times that amount 
in the case of caregiving for persons with Alzheimer's disease. Another limitation 
is the use of tax credits to recognize the costs of long term care. Kuttner states in 
the Post editorial that the income of 40 percent of the elderly is so low that no in-
come taxes are owed; these needy elderly would receive no benefit from a tax 
credit. Finally, similar to the dependent care tax credit, the proposed program re-
quires that the caregiver reside with the recipient of long term care. So, for ap-
proximately 32 percent of all providers of informal care who live apart from the 
care recipient, the tax credit would not apply (Doty, Jackson, and Crown r998). 
Compulsory Social Insurance: The Case of Germany 
While the United States has focused primarily on reforms in the private insur-
ance market for long term care, other countries are taking bolder initiatives to 
control long term care costs. In 1994, Germany passed legislation to enact a com-
pulsory social insurance policy for long term care. Prior to the enactment of this 
law, Germany addressed such needs with a combination of short-term nursing 
home coverage for those covered by national health insurance, long term care in-
surance benefits for public servants, and a means-tested program that paid for 
long term care if individuals became impoverished paying for home care or nurs-
ing home expenses. The Statutory Long Term Care Insurance Act, which went 
into effect in 1995, established a new branch of the social insurance system 
specifically for long term care insurance. All German citizens must enter into the 
program, unless they can provide evidence of a private policy that provides be-
nefits similar to the social insurance program. The program is financed by em-
ployer and employee contributions of 1. 7 percent of payroll. 
Germany's social insurance for long term care places special importance on al-
lowing persons in need to remain in the community as long as possible. To that 
end, monthly cash benefits or in-kind benefits provide coverage for home care up 
to set limits. Professional caregivers are offered relief nurses for up to four weeks a 
year. In order to provide incentives for caregiving from family members, nonpro-
fessional caregiving is treated as market-based employment by the pension pro-
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gram. When institutional care becomes necessary, the social insurance scheme al-
lows for a monthly payment to cover nursing home stays (Schulte 1996). 
Potential Impacts of Policies on Care Workers 
Attempts to increase private insurance coverage for long term care have been 
greeted with skepticism. A subsidy for long term care insurance would be re-
gressive, may benefit individuals who would have bought insurance anyway, and 
would be of value only to the minority of taxpayers who itemize deductions. The 
public-private partnerships for long term care would make Medicaid-provided 
nursing home care easier to access, when many of those interested in private in-
surance wish to avoid Medicaid. Preliminary statistics on the number of new 
policies purchased through the partnership programs have been referred to as 
"disappointing" (Wiener 1998). 
The partnerships rely on asset-protection motives to entice people to buy long 
term care insurance policies. As stated earlier, some have questioned how impor-
tant these motives are in the decision to buy insurance. In my own work, I find 
that assets do have a strong association with owning insurance for long term 
care, but only when assets are above $200,000 (Mellor 1999a). This finding sug-
gests that private long term care insurance is considered an option for those with 
substantial resources, and that the partnership program is potentially a vehicle to 
provide the well-to-do with Medicaid coverage. 
The many criticisms and limitations of private insurance options to reduce the 
financial burden of long term care can be extended to their ability to reduce in-
formal care burden. If tax incentives for long term care insurance are severely 
limited in their ability to increase long term care insurance coverage, then it fol-
lows that they are limited in their ability to alleviate costs to the public through 
Medicaid programs, and also to reduce the burden of care workers providing in-
formal care to those without insurance. 
Substitutes for Insurance 
Social insurance programs, such as the one enacted in Germany, appear to hold 
greater promise for alleviating care worker burden than do market-based policies 
aimed at increasing private insurance for long term care. The German program 
provides comprehensive coverage for long term care to all citizens, and provides 
relief for professional caregivers and pension benefits for nonprofessional (infor-
mal) caregivers. Not surprisingly, however, social insurance for long term care 
does not appear to be a politically viable option in the United States in the wake 
of the failed proposal for universal health care in the early part of the Clinton ad-
ministration. 
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The concept of compulsory social insurance has among its critics those who 
believe that social insurance can actually make an individual less well-off from 
an efficiency standpoint. Economists Peter Zweifel and Wolfram Strtiwe (1998) 
offer such a criticism of Germany's social insurance program. Their theoretical 
model of a parent's propensity to purchase long term care insurance suggests that 
when children with low wages are available as potential care providers, the pur-
chase of insurance will result in welfare loss for the parent. Zweifel and Strtiwe's 
interpretation of their theoretical results leads them to suggest that compulsory 
social long term care insurance programs will have adverse consequences for wel-
fare. 
This interpretation is based on the notion that children and insurance are in-
terchangeable - that is, children are substitutes for insurance. This concept has 
been expressed in previous literature, especially with respect to developing coun-
tries, but the question of whether the elderly do not buy insurance because of the 
availability of children (i.e., potential caregivers) had not been tested empirically 
until recently. In recent work (Mellor 19996), I found that neither the presence of 
children, nor the presence of female children specifically, reduced the extent of 
coverage for long term care insurance. In some cases, the opposite relationship 
was observed - some parents with children who were potential caregivers were 
more likely to have private insurance for long term care. These findings are in 
contrast to the notion that family members serve as substitutes for long term care 
insurance, and refute the specific criticism that social insurance programs for long 
term care are inefficient because they require the purchase of unwanted insurance 
by persons who would rather use children to substitute for insurance. While 
many concerns about social insurance for long term care remain, notably the costs 
of such a program, at least one such criticism should be ignored. 
Conclusion 
The current provision of long term care is characterized by low levels of private 
insurance, high Medicaid program costs, and a substantial contribution by infor-
mal care workers. The United States is currently addressing the financial burden 
of long term care by opting for market-based policies to increase private insur-
ance. Yet, as presented here, there are a number of reasons why tax incentives and 
public-private partnerships would have limited effects. Taxpayer deductions of 
the cost of long term care insurance are equivalent to subsidies that benefit those 
with higher incomes far more than the poor. Using public-private partnerships 
for long term care insurance may increase coverage by appealing to those with 
high levels of assets to protect, but this approach is far less appealing to the poor 
families who are bearing a sizable burden of unpaid care work. The current mar-
ket-based policies offer the greatest benefits to those with higher incomes and 
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asset levels, the same individuals who have options for the provision of long term 
care other than informal care work. The population in greatest need for better ac-
cess to long term care insurance - the low-income women and minority family 
members who are providing care at a significant cost of their time - are offered 
little relief by the current market-based policies. 
The emphasis on market-based approaches is not unique to the problem of 
long term care; instead, it echoes a larger trend toward using market principles to 
approach the reform and provision of social programs. Other examples of this 
trend are exhibited by the emphasis on privatization as a means to save Social Se-
curity, and the reform of Medicare through managed care. This trend, docu-
mented and critiqued by Jill Quadagno (1999), is based on the idea that the wel-
fare state is an impediment to market performance. The problem with applying 
market-based approaches to social problems, according to Quadagno, is that 
since they rely on the tax system and private investment they can create a two-
tiered society, where "the welfare state would consist of an investment class and 
a class of those too poor to invest" (Quadagno 1999:8). 
Returning to the case of long term care, the use of social insurance programs, 
such as that enacted in Germany, is largely overlooked as a viable option in the 
United States. Some criticize social insurance for long term care on the grounds 
that it is inefficient when family members prefer to provide care. First, one must 
challenge the notion that family members are the preferred providers of care, in 
!light of surveys in which elderly people reveal their desire to avoid burdening 
family members with the responsibility of care work (Life Plans Inc. 1992:28). 
As is more likely to be the case, children are forced into the position of provid-
ing care because other options do not exist: Medicare does not cover long term 
care, and private insurance is costly and difficult to get for those with pre-exist-
1 
ing conditions. Moreover, recent research rejects the criticism that social insur-
ance is inefficient on these grounds, finding that children are not substitutes for 
insurance. 
Social insurance for long term care is also said by some to be at odds with the 
fiscal realities faced by the United States. Social insurance for long term care in 
the United States would undoubtedly share some of the same budgetary con-
cerns that are apparent in the current debates over Social Security and Medicare 
financing. However, an important element of the cost of long term care has been 
overlooked. When the cost of informal care work to those who provide it is taken 
lnto account, social insurance may be less costly than the current approach. Gov-
::rnment decisions to save money using policies to encourage private insurance 
that appeal to the wealthy and those in higher income levels may have been made 
without considering the value of time contributed by care workers. Finally, con-
~ideration must also be given to equity. The current system, which places the 
urden of long term care largely on women, is far less equitable than a social in-
,urance system that spreads the burden across society. 
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In the absence of broad federal policies, many state and local agencies have de-
veloped programs to assist care workers in a variety of ways. These include at-
tempts to help care workers deal with stress and policies to provide respite care 
or subsidized paid care. Subsidizing formal care raises questions about whether 
family members will use formal services as substitutes for the care they provide. 
A reduction in effort could potentially increase government expenditures dra-
matically. Substitution is a complex issue; it is difficult to measure empirically, 
and some degree of substitution is actually intended as respite or relief. While no 
easy solution to the rising costs of both formal and informal long term care is at 
hand, evidence points to the limitations of private long term care insurance poli-
cies to dramatically improve coverage among the elderly. Current market-based 
approaches do not offer targeted relief to the low-income providers of informal 
care, and as a result, other policy options need to be considered. 
